

The Philosopher as Midwife and The Statesman as Weaver:
An Alternative to the Platonic Philosopher-King

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Introduction

The relationship between politics and philosophy, and more precisely between the political man and the philosopher, has often been understood as one of tension and conflict. The life of contemplation stands in distinction to the life of action, and propositions for bridging the gap between the two seem perpetually to short change one path for the other.¹ In an attempt to break away from this dichotomy of viewing the theoretical and practical as in opposition, this paper will, I hope, serve to provide novel insight into the relationship between, and compatibility of, the philosopher and the city. With this purpose in mind, this paper will pair Plato's analogies of the weaver and the midwife in order to explain the birth, construction and preservation of politics. This pairing will illuminate a unique and viable Platonic political philosophy, distinct from that of *The Republic*. While Plato's use of analogy in *The Statesman* is widely recognized as explicitly political, the same cannot be said of that device in the *Theaetetus*. The former employs the image of the weaver in order to explain how the correct statesman should construct and preserve a city. Though the latter text provides a variety of images to further the dialogue's arguments, it is the analogy of the midwife that bears the most on the realm of politics and in particular on the birthing and preparation of the participants who maintain the city.

We will proceed in the following steps. First, the midwife analogy will be explicated and the case made for the parallel between the figure of the philosopher and the midwife. This

¹ For example, the philosopher-king of *The Republic* may rule over the city, but only after sacrificing part of his happiness for the good of the state. Pocock provides a succinct summation of the general problem: "Since the time of Plato and Aristotle, the question had been intermittently discussed of the relative merits of a life spent in social activity – the *vita activa* – and a life spent in philosophical pursuit of pure knowledge – the *vita contemplativa*. To Athenians, convinced with one part of their minds that only the life of the citizen was truly ethical and human and with another that only the abstract world of unmotivated contemplation was truly intelligible and real, the problem of whether politics and philosophy were not antithetical had been a painful one" (Pocock 56).

argument will need additional evidence and treatment insofar as Plato actually presents two separate images of philosophy and the philosopher in the *Theaetetus*, one fits with our treatment of the philosopher as midwife, the other does not. Second, we will move into a discussion of the weaver as statesman in the eponymous dialogue. Here it will be made clear that the statesman and philosopher are not the same figure, but instead work together and complement one another's roles in the city. Third, the hypothesis will be put forward that these analogies map onto one another, essentially creating a seamless whole insofar as the philosopher and midwife share a function, but execute it in distinct manners. This shared function is the pairing of individuals and the assessment of their capabilities, and in particular the midwife-philosopher orchestrates the 'marriages' or pairings of individuals with appropriate teachers, and the weaver-statesman weaves together arts, individuals and factions of opposite temperaments. Finally, we will end with the implications of this midwife-weaver parallel for the success of the city and the role that the good and the just must now play within it. When we map on the analogy of the midwife to that of the weaver, we see the relationship of the philosopher to the statesman, and the mechanism through which the philosopher's theory is translated into the practical concerns of the statesman. In other words, the parallel that (a) pairs the philosopher with the theoretical and (b) the city with the practical requires that (c) the statesman serve as the conduit between the two, thus representing the translation of theoretical concerns into practical embodiments. This will allow us to posit that philosophy is the foundation of the city and that both the philosopher and the true politician are required for its maintenance.

In order to accomplish this task, the pairing and ordering of the dialogues, and the focus on these two specific analogies at the expense of others, must be justified. The *Theaetetus*, *The Statesman*, and *The Sophist* are referred to as a 'trio' of dialogues because of their shared cast of

interlocutors, parallel rhetorical devices² and thematic and temporal contact with one another. The accepted ordering of these works places the *Theaetetus* first and *The Statesman* last, with *The Sophist* occurring between them. *The Sophist* will not be dealt with in this exercise because its subject matter falls outside our purview, as its main focus is an explication of its title character and the dialogue does not employ either the analogy of the midwife or the weaver in its arguments. This ordering provides us a ground from which we can develop and map our analogies on to one another, thus demonstrating why the midwife must emerge and act prior to the weaver, and why the latter depends on the former. What is also striking, and highly relevant to our present concern about the relationship between politics and philosophy, is that the reference to Meletus at the end of the *Theaetetus* (210d) places these dialogues in direct reference to the upcoming trial and death of Socrates. The *Theaetetus* is widely believed to be the initial dialogue in a narrative octet leading up to and culminating in Socrates' execution by the Athenians (Stern 275). The analogies of the midwife and the weaver were specifically chosen from the plethora of analogies and metaphors that Plato uses within these dialogues because they are the two successful (or, at least, unrefuted) images within the texts. Furthermore, concerning the *Theaetetus*, the analogy of the midwife is the only one that can be directly linked to politics, external concerns or relations between men. The other analogies, such as the block of wax and the aviary, focus on the internal workings of memory, language and knowledge, and are not immediately applicable to the public world. The case of *The Statesman* is slightly more complicated in that a variety of analogies relate directly to the role of the political ruler. However, the statesman as herdsman, doctor and ship's captain are all effectively subsumed by the image of the weaver as the dialogue proceeds, leaving us with the weaver as the

² See Lane (2005) or Benardete's *The Being of the Beautiful* for a treatment of the three dialogues as a whole unit. As for shared rhetorical devices, see Socrates' play on the perception and recognition of men (143e, 144de, 257d-258a), and the discussion of syllables, elements, and their relationship to complexes (203a-204a, 277e-278a).

true embodiment of the statesman.³ Finally, contrary to other readings (Weiss 213, Kahn 51), I do not take the political philosophy of *The Statesman* as an undeveloped ‘bridge’ between Plato’s earlier work in *The Republic* and his last dialogue *The Laws*. However, as this is a controversial claim, I should make plain that the ulterior purpose of this exercise will be to demonstrate the novelty and uniqueness of the image of politics portrayed in *The Statesman* and the *Theaetetus* as distinct from the rest of the Platonic corpus.

Socrates as Midwife: Birthing of Ideas in Men

In the *Theaetetus* Socrates describes himself as a midwife. This analogy has a dual meaning. First, the analogy illustrates how Socrates views his relationship to his students and interlocutors. Second, by co-opting the duties of the human midwife, the analogy demonstrates more generally the function of such an individual within a city. Regarding the initial point, Socrates explains to Theaetetus that the frustration the latter feels is a case of labor pains from pregnancy with an idea (148e). Socrates goes on to explain that he, like women midwives, possesses the skill to help Theaetetus give birth:

Now my art of midwifery is just like theirs in most respects. The difference is that I attend men and not women, and that I watch over the labor of their souls, not of their bodies. And the most important thing about my art is the ability to apply all possible tests to the offspring, to determine whether the young mind is being delivered of a phantom, that is, an error, or a fertile truth. For one thing which I have in common with the ordinary midwives is that I myself am barren of wisdom (150bc).

Here we see that Socrates’ account of midwifery focuses both on the delivery of an end product, or child, and on the testing of that child. He also makes clear that this child is the product of his interlocutor and never of himself, since he possesses no wisdom or idea of his own. Whether this skill of midwifery itself can be defined as a sort of knowledge is a question for an entirely

³ The competing analogies will be dealt with explicitly later in the paper.

different discussion. But Socrates' argument here seems to rely not upon whether the art of midwifery constitutes knowledge but upon whether the object he is aiding the individual to give birth to is in any way a product or reflection of Socrates. On this point Socrates is definitive: it is not. This midwife of the soul also judges whether the idea is fertile or a wind-egg, presumably through the dialectical process seen throughout the *Theaetetus*, where Socrates questions Theaetetus on his hypotheses in order to determine the validity of his accounts. In this sense, both types of midwives, through bringing on pains or allaying them, and bringing the subject to term or inducing a miscarriage (149d, 151a), possess a wide degree of influence on the individual and the birth.

There is however a striking difference between the midwife of the body and that of the soul. The latter's focus is not simply on delivery and judgment but also on molding and reshaping the individual in labor. In fact, the dialogue concludes with the assertion that the main goal of the midwife of souls is not the birth of the idea, but birthing and preparing an individual to produce ideas and interact with other men. Socrates tells Theaetetus that,

if ever you should attempt to conceive or should succeed in conceiving other theories, they will be better ones as the result of this enquiry. And if you remain barren, your companions will find you gentler and less tiresome; you will be modest and not think you know what you don't know. This is all my art can achieve – nothing more...[I] deliver men that are young and generous of spirit, all that have any beauty (210c).

Unlike the midwife of the body, Socrates here illustrates that his purpose is explicitly wrapped up in tempering and shaping the individual giving birth, not merely in the ideas that spring from the student. Here he delivers both the "men that are young," as well as their ideas. Even if the student fails to give birth to any theories in the future, his soul will still be better from having undergone the midwifing process with Socrates. As Theodorus notes, "youth can always profit" from Socrates' treatments (146b). This shift in subject, from that of the child (or idea) to that of

the parent (or patient) is significant insofar as it illustrates that Socrates' goal is to make men better not only for the production and assessment of knowledge but for their relationships and interactions with one another. Socrates explains the initial conditions, process and aims of his midwifing:

At first some of them [those who associate with Socrates] may give the impression of being ignorant and stupid; but as time goes on and our association continues, all whom God permits are seen to make progress – a progress which is amazing to both other people and to themselves...they discover within themselves a multitude of beautiful things, which they bring forth into the light. But it is I, with God's help, who deliver them of this offspring (150d).⁴

Yet because Socrates has expanded the purview of midwifing, with the end goal that his patients, regardless of whether they bear offspring or not, be more temperate, generous and modest in their behaviors and judgments, the function of the midwife begins to take on additional significance for both the patients and their relation to the city at large. The process brings about a change that is not only internal to the patient, but also noticeable to others, either in the form of the patients' altered temperament or in the type of ideas produced and made public by the same man.

Socrates continues his expansion of the purview of midwifery by drawing in another activity of the traditional, female midwife. In addition to inducing labor, promoting miscarriages or treating pains, the midwives serve as matchmakers (149d). Because of the midwives' hesitation to be associated with pimps and prostitution, or 'procurer', they are not vocal or public about this portion of their craft, Socrates claims (150a). However, as he sees it, no one is better equipped to predict the appropriateness of individuals for one another or the nature of their potential offspring. He sees himself too as fulfilling the matchmaking function, but instead of

⁴ Though Socrates refers to God (θεός) in this passage, there is no need to see this 'God' as a separate entity, external to Socrates himself. When we look toward the end of the same speech, we see that in fact Socrates intends these instances of 'God' in the sense that they are related to or part of his inner voice or force (μοι διαμυνιον) and not as a distinct and separate divine power (151a).

pairing men and women, Socrates pairs young men with appropriate teachers for the production of good souls and virtues. Those young men who are not pregnant “have no need of me [Socrates], and with the best will in the world I undertake the business of match-making...at guessing with whom they might profitably keep company. Many of them I have given away to Prodicus; and a great number also to other wise and inspired persons” (151b). However, some young men are of the best natures and ‘pregnant’ in such a manner that Socrates can help them to deliver their offspring. His interactions with and treatment of Theaetetus serve as a good, but rare, example of both this type of soul and the process of training and birthing that this type is capable of undergoing. Keeping this in mind, when Socrates initially describes himself as a midwife, he refers to his mother, Phaenarete. As Burnyeat notes, her name means “She who brings virtue to light” (268). Because Socrates draws the direct parallel between himself and his mother on more than one occasion (149a, 210c), cites her name explicitly and concludes the dialogue with the assertion that he helps to shape the characters of young men through his art, the case can be made that Socrates sees his job of midwifery as ‘bringing virtue to light’ in men, both in their ideas, their souls and through their subsequent interactions with one another. This virtue can take on a variety of forms, but the clearest example from the *Theaetetus* is virtue as knowledge. In 146c, Socrates asks Theaetetus, ‘what is knowledge?’, to which Theaetetus eventually responds that, “if putting one’s heart into it is all that is required...the answer will *come to light*” (148d, emphasis mine). Knowledge is brought to light just as is virtue, and we see that it is midwifery that brings both into being.

However, knowledge and virtue are not the only goods brought forth in the process of midwifery. As Socrates states in 150d, his patients “bring forth into the light” “a multitude of beautiful things.” This ‘multitude’ can be understood in more general terms than knowledge

alone, insofar as it directly precedes the passage where Socrates discusses those individuals who quit the process too soon and fail to give birth to their ideas. In this passage we learn that their quitting resulted in their being thought of as “ignorant fools, both by themselves and everyone else” (150e). Socrates gives one example of such a failed individual, “Aristeides the son of Lysimachus” (151a). As we know from Plato’s *Laches*, Socrates tutored Aristeides and described his education as the process “in which virtue might be added to the soul(s)...to make them better” (190b). Socrates goes on to explain that this type of virtue is not singular in nature, but is composed of many parts, including “courage...temperance and justice” (198a). Though Aristeides failed in this goal insofar as he quit the process, the example still represents the wide variety of virtues, including those of a public or political nature, which Socrates’ midwifery aims ‘to bring to light’. In this sense, Socrates delivers his young interlocutors in order to bring virtue into the world, both in the form of ideas and theories, but also through men’s relationships with one another by tempering those noble souls to act virtuously even if they fail to give birth to knowledge.⁵

Again Theaetetus serves as a paradigmatic example of the suitable Socratic patient: (I) Socrates has preliminarily and accurately judged the natural aptitude and ability of Theaetetus (142cd, 143de, 144a), (II) Theaetetus exhibits symptoms of a philosophic nature (155cd) and (III) we know from the introduction of the dialogue, from Eucleides’ and Terpsion’s estimation of Theaetetus as a grown man, that Socrates was correct in his original assessment of Theaetetus’ nature (142b). Yet as we have seen, not all young men are suited to study with Socrates the midwife. Not all have or are capable of revealing that sort of virtue. Based on Socrates’

⁵ Sedley advances a similar conclusion when he states that, “the overall effect of Socrates’ midwifery is nevertheless beneficial (210b11-c4): the thorough examination which today’s offspring have undergone will make the young man’s future pregnancies better ones; and on those future occasions when he is not pregnant he will at least be suitably modest, thanks to a new-found awareness of his own ignorance” (36).

judgment, the other types not suited for this process are to be matched by him with more appropriate teachers (see the above reference to 151b), who will help these young men develop the best use of their natural potential. Thus, Socrates also has the role of helping them fulfill their characters and potential albeit under different tutelage and through activities other than Socratic philosophy. If Socrates sees himself as revealing virtue both in his students' ideas, and in their souls and behaviors, he must expect that the resultant individual will eventually aid the city with moderate and generous judgments. However, before we arrive at the discussion of the political or civic role of these midwifed young men, let us explore the role of Socrates further, and specifically the relationship of the philosopher to Socrates the midwife.

The Two Philosophers: A Refutation

If we take Socrates at his word and see midwifery as a means to bring virtue to light, the connotations of discovery and virtue apparent in this statement seem compatible with a conventional definition of philosophy. However, before rushing to the conclusion that Socrates can be thought of as (a) solely a midwife, (b) solely a philosopher or (c) that the philosopher and midwife occupy the same role and function, let us examine how the philosopher is treated in the *Theaetetus*. We soon discover that the references to philosophy in the *Theaetetus* are murky at best, and contradictory at worst. Socrates depicts the philosopher of the political digression as someone absolutely free with no care for time (173d). The philosopher does not know his way to the marketplace, the courts or assembly (173c). He is ignorant of political and public affairs, and though "his body...lives and sleeps in the city," his mind "spurns" those practical topics and "pursues its winged way," "he knows not even that he knows not" concerning the human world (173e). Socrates demonstrates the philosopher's separation from the world with the anecdote of

Thales. Thales tripped and fell into a well because he was so occupied with the ‘greatest question’ of the world and sky that he “failed to see what was in front of him and under his feet” (174a). As Socrates points out, “it really is true that the philosopher fails to see his next-door neighbor; he not only doesn’t notice what he is doing; he scarcely knows whether he is a man or some other kind of creature” (174b). This presentation of the philosopher is rendered comic by the lack of care for the world and the obliviousness of his position in it. Yet it is exactly because this depiction of the philosopher occurs within the context of the explicitly titled political digression,⁶ as well as of Socrates’ impending trial in Athens, that this mockery of the philosopher cannot be Socrates’ truthful vision of the profession. Philosophy would be a selfish and fruitless endeavor if philosophers were hermits who failed to interact with men or to help spread their discoveries and inquiries amongst others. As Stern states, “in opposition to his [Socrates] own philosophic concern for that which is good, beautiful, and just, Socrates portrays the Philosopher as otherworldly and apolitical, ignorant or neglectful of the transitory, particular, and trivial affairs of humans” (280). Precisely because Socrates comes to the table with philosophic concerns as well as a method and aim in his interactions with his interlocutors, the temptation to think of him as the philosopher is strong. However, if the version of the philosopher from the digression is a false one, is it appropriate that we look to Socrates as a figure who correctly represents the profession? To answer this question, we must turn to the characterization of the man himself.

Socrates clearly does not fit the mold of Thales for a host of reasons. He was familiar with politics, always in the marketplace, seemingly lived for the discussion and interactions that took place among men and was by no means free of time constraints, as his impending trial

⁶ See 172a and 177bc.

illustrates.⁷ Lane agrees that “this portrait of the philosopher is not, whatever else it may be, a portrait of Socrates” (2005 8). Yet considering that as midwife, Socrates sees himself as ‘bringing virtue to light,’ one might propose that Socrates is presented as the image of the philosopher on grounds other than the illustration of the Thales-type philosopher of the digression. Because of his direct interactions with others, his awareness of public concerns and the impending collision between the official world of politics and his function as the ‘virtue-bringer’ of the city, we can make the case that Socrates is not only a midwife, but a philosopher as well. In order to do this, we must take a step back from viewing Socrates as simply another participant in the dialogue and instead look at him as a whole, paying attention to his method as well as to his leadership and dialectical aims within the dialogue.

If we take Plato to be the architect of Socrates the character, then we can begin to understand the type of figure that Socrates has been cast to play. As A.A. Long so succinctly states,

Plato draws no distinction between philosophical activity and the life and interpersonal discourse of Socrates...Plato has forged a virtually continuous link between his method of presenting the philosopher to the public and his own representations of Socrates. He has repeatedly defined the philosopher, ostensibly, via these representations...Socrates is represented as *the living paradigm of* what it means to be *a philosopher* – a person uniquely committed to an interpersonal search for knowledge and to practices that never deviate from this commitment (117-18, emphasis mine).

If we take Socrates to be the philosopher, then the image of the philosopher from the political digression comes to signify not only a false representation of the profession, but also one that stands opposite to that of the true philosopher. In this sense, the true philosopher is intrinsically related to the political world, not in a formal sense as a public official, but certainly as someone

⁷ Lane makes a similar point when she states that, “although Socrates does include himself among those with a philosophic nature in *Republic VI*, we have seen that in the *Theaetetus*, his portrait of the philosopher in some ways excludes himself as he has actually become, being deprived of leisure as a result of his trial and acting meanwhile as Athens’ gadfly” (2005 19).

who urges the individuals of a community to question their surroundings, actions and judgments. If we look to 176a-c, we see what form or aim this philosophical drive takes in relation to the outside world. To “pursue virtue,” a statement strikingly similar to the previously discussed ‘bringing virtue to light,’ Socrates states, “a man should make all haste to escape from earth to heaven...escape means becoming as like a God as possible; and a man becomes like a God when he becomes just and pure, with understanding” (176ab). Though this activity initially appears to entail a rejection of the world, if we read on we see it is actually meant as an acknowledgement of the limits of mankind, and therefore a subsequent embrace of virtue in relation to worldly goods like justice: “In God there is no sort of wrong whatsoever, he is supremely just, and the thing most like him is the man who has become as just *as it lies in human nature* to be” (176c, emphasis mine). Based on the context of this statement, the human nature referred to within it is one that can only be fulfilled within a community of men. As Socrates states, the job of the philosopher is to “draw(s) someone to a higher level, and induce(s) him to abandon questions of ‘My injustice towards you, or your injustice towards me’ for an examination of justice and injustice themselves” (175bc). The relationship of the philosopher to the community of men in a city is then not one of abandonment or escape, but instead one of betterment and virtue bringing. Unlike Thales who sought knowledge of complexes but neglected to inquire as to the elements that constitute them,⁸ Socrates’ version of philosophy bridges the gap between the abstract and the commonplace. This version takes on the character of a truly political philosophy, insofar as it aware of the elements (or political things) and seeks to understand the complexes (or ideas) that they make up. Therefore, in ‘bringing virtue to light’ by seeking knowledge of justice in

⁸ i.e. Looking to the sky to understand the world and its nature, all the while not even knowing that he is unaware of the component parts and the inhabitants that occupy said world.

men Socrates becomes able to pursue the same end and expand upon it within, and for the sake of, the city.

As in the *Theaetetus*, in order to discover what knowledge is, we must question and refute what it is not, discovering our own limits and inability to answer sufficiently all the questions put before us. Philosophy is a communal affair, with the philosopher as a lead trainer of the discussion's participants. Despite Socrates' continual assertions that he possesses no knowledge of his own, he does possess the capacity to make normative judgments of other's theories, as well as to criticize the improper use or employment of a skill or profession. And thus in the political digression does "Socrates make[s] ethical, ontological, and theoretical pronouncements" (Long 117). In keeping with that concern, Socrates attacks the traditional understanding of the philosopher with a philosophic, and implicitly normative, method of his own. With Socrates as the philosopher, the process of judgment elucidated during the analogy of the midwife becomes far less abstract and takes on an eminently political character, one that brings critical analysis of human life and its political contexts front and center to any philosophical debate. As Stern aptly argues,

the philosophic life involves a *search* for *phronesis* rather than its presumed possession (*Statesman* 272c4). In substantiating the good of philosophy so understood, the *political* character of the human context is crucial...Socrates' consideration of the political character of the human context lets us see that the question of our good thus endures and, most importantly, that so then does the need for inquiry (287, author's emphasis).

If inquiry is the method, virtue its aim and the content inherently political insofar as it relates to the condition of men and their natures, then the problem of the philosopher is no longer that he may fall into a well on account of absent-mindedness and distance from the world, but altogether different. Socrates the philosopher is so caught up in the process of inquiry and the introduction of virtue into the world that he develops a different sort of absent-mindedness. By placing

himself within reach of men and the public in general, he risks vulnerability before those who see no value in his philosophical inquiries, but who play a part in formal political life. If this philosopher is vulnerable to these individuals, then the possibility arises that he will be eliminated from the very city where he hoped to increase virtue and justice.

The Midwife as Philosopher

This public versus private paradox has traditionally anchored the debate regarding the relationship between the philosopher and politics in Platonic thought. Either the philosopher is entirely absent from the political world (i.e. Thales), or he is drawn into politics and killed by his city (i.e. Socrates). Previous hypotheses concerning the way out of this conundrum have focused on the philosopher-king of *The Republic* as Plato's solution. As Rowe states,

In general, we may say, there are two images of the philosopher in the dialogues: one of the philosopher as he is...blundering about in the real world and falling down wells because he has his head in the clouds, and one of the philosopher as he might be in a different world, which he has organized after his own images, as he – ideally, but impossibly – would be (76).

However, there would appear to be a middle ground, as of yet untouched by scholars. Instead of a philosopher-king who restructures the political community, placing himself as its head, a different and novel integration of the philosopher into politics is found if we see the philosopher and the midwife as functionally one and the same. As Stern states, the good of mankind is inexorably tied to the “need of inquiry.” Within this alternative conception of the role of the philosopher we have a system integrating political philosophy with the midwife's method of testing and judgment. As we saw from the midwife passage, the aim is not solely to produce more virtuous theories but to make men more virtuous as well, altering their conditions and tempering their future interactions with one another. Using Socrates as our template, we can

begin to see how the combination of inquiry, virtue and training makes the philosopher an integral part of politics. As we will see shortly, this combination also protects the position of the philosopher within the city.

The key to understanding the unity of the midwife and the philosopher is found in the relationship of each to the student. As Socrates demonstrates by referring to himself as a midwife, but revealing himself to be a philosopher, these seemingly disparate characters are united by their focus on the delivery and development of their subject, whether that be the man or his theory. As we saw previously in 151b and 155cd, Socrates chooses only those of the best natures as his own patients. The remainder are sent to other mentors who are more capable of developing the natures of those students. The resultant individuals will better serve the city by undertaking different functions within it. Again as we saw from the midwife passage, Socrates' midwife is concerned with the shaping of the individual as well as his ideas, but what exactly is he molding them into or training them for? He gives us a slight hint in stating that those who are not pregnant are sent to "Prodicus [the sophist] and a great number also to other wise and inspired persons" (151b). Presumably these "other wise and inspired" gentlemen are those possessing a skill or craft that requires much training but little transformation or development of ideas. For argument's sake, let us posit that this class of individuals includes doctors, sophists, rhetoricians and so on, men all integral to the well-being of the city but not directly responsible for its founding or governing.

What then do the young men midwifed by Socrates become? Keeping in mind our framework of Socrates as both a midwife and a philosopher, who views the political condition as central to his inquiry, we are led to the conclusion that the young men that he delivers will become future philosopher-midwives or statesmen; some will be philosopher-midwives because

Socrates is able to pass on his own craft to others capable of receiving it, and others will be statesmen insofar as he molds the remainder of his patients to be more prudent, just and moderate in their decisions. The future philosopher-midwives are those capable of producing fertile ideas and bringing virtue to light, while the future statesmen-weavers produce only wind-eggs but have a connection with and concern for virtue on account of their education. In order to substantiate this claim about Socrates midwifing two distinct types of men, we must first step back from the dialogue briefly and examine the individuals who were Socrates' students.¹⁰ As we know from Platonic corpus' the cast of characters, and on a few occasions from Socrates' narration,¹¹ the young men that he interacted with in speech came from social and political backgrounds that entailed their predisposition for lives in the public sphere. From here we can draw the conclusion that Socrates was already selecting his students from a specific type or class of young men in the city (i.e. the Athenian elite), and not from the more general population. If most of these young men were already destined for a life of politics, then it seems logical to make the assumption that when Socrates' speaks of his midwifing as making men more gentle and virtuous, and his students are by social rank predisposed to become statesmen, that one functions of Socrates' midwifery is to make those future statesmen more gentle and virtuous. Therefore, Socrates is capable of educating two types of students: those future philosophers who can give birth to virtue themselves, and those future statesmen who are made respectfully aware of virtues' rightful presence and conduits (i.e. the philosophers) within the city.

However, to turn back to the discussion of midwifery itself, we can see that even within the short space of the *Theaetetus*, the transformation of its title character into a philosopher-

¹⁰ And by students, I mean specifically those young men who were Socrates' interlocutors.

¹¹ See the *Apology* 33d-34b where he cites the families of some of his students in defense against the claim that he corrupts the young. It is clear by the names of the men referred to, but also by their very presence in the Assembly, that his students were men (and came from families) of public distinction.

midwife has already begun. Socrates initially refers to the art of midwifery as one that is distinctly his (“my art of midwifery” and “I want you to come to me as to one who is both the son of a midwife and himself skilled in the art”), and that he will be applying to the other characters.¹² However, as the dialogue and process of inquiry wears on, we notice a subtle shift from Socrates’ art to one that includes the other two participants. In the first instance, Socrates is speaking to Theodorus and states that, “what we must do is to make use of our (*hemas*) midwife’s art to deliver Theaetetus of the thought which he had conceived about the nature of knowledge” (184bc). Here we see that the study of mathematics and mathematicians are also to be considered a part of philosophy, and not grouped with the other lesser crafts.¹³ This leads us to believe that there are several, though most certainly not many, individuals within the city who are capable of delivering the best sorts of young men. Additionally, at the end of the dialogue, Socrates refers to “our (*hemin*) art of midwifery” when engaging with Theaetetus (210b). This illustrates the degree to which this art can be transmitted from the practitioner to the patient. As a midwife he cares for the birthing of virtue. As a philosopher he cares for justice, politics and men. By imbuing these characteristics into the future philosophers and statesmen of the city, Socrates ensures the creation and maintenance of a good and just city, as witnessed in the perpetuation of the dialectical give-and-take between philosophers and their young trainees, and by default, the philosopher’s security within that system insofar as he is a required participant. This latter point would seem a particularly relevant outcome considering the context of Socrates’ own life. The *Theaetetus* focuses mostly on the transference of midwifery-philosophy to its title character. However, recalling that there are those students that Socrates treats, but who go on to

¹² See all references to this art in 149a-151e.

¹³ While there are many scholars who feel that Socrates mocks Theodorus or thinks of his skills as a mathematician as closer to sophistry than philosophy in the *Theaetetus*, and though many of the arguments are persuasive, they are still hard to square with this line of Socrates’ from the dialogue. For a compelling account of this competing view, see Miller 1980 pp. 3-5.

give birth to wind-eggs, we must now focus our attention on these individuals. If his patients who go on to produce their own theories are the philosophers, then his patients who fail in this regard, and merely become tempered and more skilled in judgment, are the statesmen.

The Weaver as Statesman

Before we shift the focus and jump into the discussion of the weaver as the statesman, it is necessary to note that the main speaker in *The Statesman* is no longer Socrates but the Eleatic Stranger.¹⁴ This matters or not depending on one's reading of the text. Since the *Theaetetus* presents midwifery as an activity to be practiced by others in addition to Socrates, this shift matters. Just as we saw Socrates include Theodorus as a practitioner of midwifery, we can also interpret the Stranger as incorporated into that practice in a similar fashion. Similarly, we must also make clear who and what the statesman is and is not. Most importantly for our argument, the statesman is not the philosopher. The philosopher cannot act as the statesman because he does not take on the combinatory role of weaving (280e-281a). The philosopher handles the constituent parts of the 'garment' or city prior to the statesman's "plaiting [them] together" in his web of politics (281a). This presents us with substantial evidence that the ruler in *The Statesman* cannot be a philosopher-king and helps us on our path of finding an alternative option regarding the role and position of the philosopher. Additionally, the statesman is not a sophist, herald or priest (290b-291c). Instead, the statesman is supervisory in his relationship with the city and politics, and rules over all those other sciences concerning "persuasion and speaking" (304d). The case has also been made that the ship's captain and physician serve as equally valid analogies to the statesman as the weaver. However, if we look at the requirements of each, we

¹⁴ To be referred to as simply the Stranger for the remainder of this exercise.

are drawn to the conclusion that only the weaver suffices as an adequate representation of the statesman.

Before we deal with these alternate figures, we must explore the way the Stranger sets up the parallel between weaving and statesmanship. The Stranger asserts that the “art of weaving...does not at all differ except in name from [this] cloakmaking, just as...the royal art did not differ from the political” (280a). If we take this statement at face value, then cloakmaking is interchangeable with weaving, and the royal art with the political art. However, these are not interchangeable. The making of a cloak is a subset of the more general art of weaving, just as the royal art (*hê basilikê*) is a subset of the political art (*hê politikê*). The argument would appear nonsensical if one were to say that the particular rules over the general, and for our purposes that the royal man either rules over or is interchangeable with the truly political man. This leads us to believe that not only is the philosopher separate from the statesman, but the royal is subsumed by the political and the statesman rules over all of the more particular forms of his art. From this point forward in the dialogue, and despite assuring the reader that they are one and the same, Plato consistently refers to the political art and royal art separately with different language for the remainder of the text. Even the concluding line of the dialogue refers to these figures as distinct from one another: “You completed and perfected most beautifully again for us, stranger, the *royal man* and the *statesman*” (311c).¹⁵ An additional piece of evidence for the superiority of the political man over the royal man is the Stranger’s inclusion of the seventh form of government, as separate from kingship: “let’s cut each one of these [forms of rule] in two and make six [forms of government], but separate apart from these the right regime as the seventh...*out of monarchy...there was a royal and a tyrannical regime*” (302cd). Here we can see that there is a position etched out at the top of the hierarchy of regimes

¹⁵ “Kallista au ton basilikon apetelesas andra hemin, o xene, kai ton politikon.”

as a seventh and correct regime (*orthê politeia*), and royal rule is subsumed not only by this seventh form of statesmanship but also by the additional division and category of monarchy. The very mention of this seventh and separate form causes us to further question the validity or seriousness that Plato means to convey when he states that the royal is the same as the political.

Keeping this split in mind, we can now turn to the problem that it poses to the alternative analogies to statesmanship, specifically the art of piloting and the art of medicine. The Stranger brings up these two arts as possible parallels to that of statesmanship, naming the ship's captain, doctor and statesmen as the respective heads of each art. We can use our previous parallel that subsumed cloakmaking under weaving to illustrate how both piloting and medicine would be subsumed under other arts, whether they be the art of sailing or the art of healing. What allows us to do this, and focus on the weaver as the true parallel of the statesman is that the Stranger refers to both the ship's captain and physician as 'royal rulers' (*hoi basilikoi archontes*) and not as political men more generally (297e). These men may serve as parallels for the royal art, but not for the more general political one. Having determined what the statesman is and is not, we can now turn to the specifics of his role as symbolized by the weaver.

Whereas the midwife had two functions (the bringing to light of virtue, and the pairing of students with teachers), the weaver has three. And unlike in the *Theaetetus*, where we had to determine for ourselves that the midwife and the philosopher were the same character, in *The Statesman* we can be positive that the weaver represents the statesman.¹⁶ Traditionally understood, the weaver serves three main functions: (I) to judge appropriately and expertly the strings that go into weaving (ensuring that none of them are broken, fragile, etc.),¹⁷ (II) to

¹⁶ See 279ab and 309a.

¹⁷ Plato does not explicitly state that the weaver judges the character of the individual strings. However, as the carder and spinner are solely productive in their functions, and the weaver is in a supervisory role, it would seem

maintain the appropriate tension of the threads on the canvas and (III) to produce a whole garment or tapestry from the constituent strings. The political equivalents set up by the weaver analogy are as follows: the statesman (I) assesses the roles, duties and capabilities of the polis' citizens, (II) balances the factions within the city and (III) creates an inclusive polis, or web of politics – a product that is stable because of the mutual dependence of each of its constituent parts.

Plato's analogy of weaving illustrates that the statesman's purpose is to best order and guide the competing and conflicting independent natures of moderation and courage inherent between men, as well as within each them. The first portion of *The Statesman's* argument deals with both the external and internal tensions in mankind that must be woven together if stability is to result. As the Stranger states, men's souls can be broken down into two disparate types, the well-ordered and the manly or courageous.¹⁸ The Stranger refers to the well-ordered and the courageous as the pair of virtues (308b). The former are characterized by their quiet natures, "minding their own business alone by themselves, associating with everyone at home on these terms, and likewise, in confronting cities on the outside, they are prepared on every issue to be at peace in some sense" (307e). The courageous, on the other hand, are aggressors always preparing for war, "they settle into a hatred with many powerful people, and either they altogether destroy them, or in turn they hazard their own fatherlands to be slaves and subjects to

plausible that the latter be in a position to assess the strings to insure their adequacy before deciding to incorporate them into the garment (see 282a-283a).

¹⁸ There is a discussion in the *Theaetetus* regarding the two natures or temperaments of men as well (144ab). What is interesting about that passage is that it presents Theaetetus as straddling a middle path between the two natures. According to Theodorus' estimation of the young man, he has "never yet seen anyone so amazingly gifted. Along with a quickness beyond the capacity of most people, he has an unusually gentle temper; and, to crown it all, he is as manly a boy as any of his fellows" (144a). Perhaps this passage sheds additional light on the nature of Socrates' patients. Even before they are midwived, these young men represent a combination of the two natures, without possessing any of their concomitant faults. The future midwife-philosophers and statesmen-weavers are both "acute and keen and retentive," but lack the destructive "mad excitement" of the overly courageous, and are "steadier" and balanced, but without the "sluggishness" and "bad memory" of the too orderly (144b).

their enemies” (308a). When left to their own devices, these types never mix, leaving those well-ordered souls “always the prey of aggressors...[who] often become without their being aware of its slaves” (307e), whereas those courageous souls “flourish at the beginning at a peak of strength, [but] in the end...burst out altogether in fits of madness” (310d). As a general process, the weaver combines the woof and warp threads, using those threads both soft and appropriate to one another and maintains the proper tension so that none of the threads break and the piece remains whole (282e-83a, 309b). The statesman adopts the weaving process but applies it to men, intertwining their natures by employing only the moderate, and not the extremes, of the orderly and courageous souls in order to produce a balanced and just city (308e-309a, 311a-c). This working-together of individuals occurs through political appointments, friendships and the day-to-day interactions that make the bonds between men stronger. The true statesman also aligns the conflicting virtues between men for the overall good of the city through the use of laws and education. Here law and education function as formative framework that provides the statesman with the ability to fuse the moderate and the courageous through training and constraint into a well-ordered society. In this sense, “weaving reveals itself as the structure of the statesman’s activity in relation to the citizens. The lawgiver and commanding expert is also a political weaver” (Lane 1998 163). The statesman takes on the role of the good legislator by legislating how men’s nature and agency should be reshaped and molded by law (310a). While the discussion prior to this point has focused on the external tensions and conflicts between types of men, the statesman’s job also involves weaving internally conflicting virtues together within men themselves. The statesman brings together the well-ordered and courageous through marriage and childrearing to temper the presence of each virtue within the soul by combining them over and over again in each subsequent generation. But “as ruler of the entire

polis...the weaver must weave together *all* the arts, psychic, social, and physical – he cannot limit himself to the psychic – and he cannot concentrate his efforts solely on improving individual souls one by one” (Weiss 222, emphasis author’s). Therefore, the statesman takes the disparate parts of the city, both of individual natures and the external relations between them, and weaves them together to create a solid and durable product.

This dual process of weaving results in the web of politics, the metaphorical city as a garment. The web represents

the character of manly and moderate human beings woven together by direct intertexture whenever the royal art brings together their life into a common one by unanimity and friendship and completes the best and most magnificent of all webs...and by wrapping everyone else in the cities in it, slaves and free, holds them together by this plaiting, and to the extent that it’s suitable for a city to become happy, by omitting nothing that in any way belongs to this, rules and supervises (311bc).

It is worth noting here that weaving even in its literal textile form carried with it the symbolism of the city at large. As Ruby Blondell states, the final woven garments that weavers produced “symbolized Athens as a democratic polis” (49-50). However, unlike a weaving which has a static and finite existence, such as a cloak or woolen garment, the statesman’s product is a flexible and infinitely dynamic product of human interactions. The weaving is not a one-dimensional mixing of people but is instead a multi-dimensional and unending process of individuals coming together over the existence of a community. As Lane rightly notes, “people cannot be bound into place as threads can be; to bind them is to bind them, not into place, but more closely to one another” (1998 173-74). Individuals come together publicly, socially and privately, give birth, die and order their interactions with one another with regard to the framework of law and education that both shapes and is given shape by them. The web is not simply the physical mixing of individuals to produce families or the buildings and architecture

that gives shape to the city, but also exists in the invisible spaces between them. It is ever strengthened by time, proximity and frequency of intermixing.

The Partnership of the Midwife and Weaver

One unusual feature of the midwife and weaver analogies is Plato's choice to use two traditionally feminine roles as his analogies for the development of political actors and the maintenance of political life. This is strange for a number of reasons. Since women were not present in the public realm of Greece, their activities are not the most obvious basis for an exposition of the requirements of political life. However, when one digs past the surface of Plato's usage, a different dimension becomes apparent. The parallel further clarifies the function and duty of the philosopher and statesman. Plato uses the traditional connotations of women as generative, reproductive and stabilizing forces to give his philosopher and statesman a stronger rooting in the community and to suggest that the polis requires their presence for its preservation. Based on how philosophers and women are traditionally presented within the dialogues, we discover that these two actors have similar identities within the city. They are generally both (I) alienated from the public sphere, (II) in possession of regenerative/productive capacities, and (III) necessary for the maintenance and perpetuation of the city. Regarding the statesman, the latter two points hold and it is significant that the initial one does not, as it illustrates further that the philosopher and the statesman are distinct occupations. However, the relevant difference remains between women and both of our characters, that instead of producing children the philosopher and the statesman generate virtue and civic stability.

Now we are able to continue on to the final point. The philosopher and the statesman are disparate figures who partner to create and maintain a good city. This partnership relies on two

mechanisms: (I) the act of pairing and (II) the translation of the theoretical into the practical. Both the philosopher and the statesman share and practice the skill of pairing, but to different ends. This is why the ordering of the dialogues, insofar as it illustrates the necessity that the philosopher act prior to the statesman, is significant. As we saw from the analogy of the philosopher-midwife, the philosopher pairs the students with appropriate teachers based on their type of soul. Those whom Socrates pairs with himself undergo the dialectic process and become more virtuous and generous both in disposition and in their theoretical exports. The types of men whom Socrates delivers are future philosopher-midwives or statesmen, depending on their natures (i.e. those who are capable of giving birth to fertile ideas versus those who can only give birth to wind-eggs). On the other side of the equation, the statesman employs the skill of pairing in two ways, by weaving together the divergent types of men in the city, and by tempering each type of virtue in interweaving women and men of those disparate natures in marriage and through the generation of children. The philosopher's pairings occur prior to those of the statesman's insofar as the former provides the materials for the latter to construct his web of politics.

Just as the wool in the weaving metaphor, the philosopher's patient must also undergo a refining and tempering before he is plaited into the rest of the city. The Stranger discusses this predecessor art, and calls it the art of woolworking (280a). Woolworking consists of two functions, the carding and the spinning. The carders will rid the wool of the bad and unusable portions (282ab). The spinners then take the treated wool and fashion it into threads (282cd). Only once these threads have been created are they turned over to the weaver to incorporate into a fabric (282e-283b). Just as Socrates the midwife sorted through his potential patients, purging some and divvying up the remaining young men amongst appropriate tutors, so here we see the

same action assigned to the statesman and as weaver. The philosophers take the raw material, or young men, and through teaching transform them into a functional material of the city.¹⁹ The statesmen then picks up these ‘threads’ and integrates them into the city.

The second mechanism at play in the partnership between our two figures is the transformation of theoretical concerns into practical actions and policies. As we have discovered, the philosopher brings virtue to light through midwifery. This results either in the delivery of theories and knowledge (for the future production of new theories), or the training of additional generations to take part in this virtue-begetting exercise. However, in addition to training future philosopher-midwives, because of the eminently political content of his philosophy, the philosopher-midwife more commonly trains the future statesman. This creation of statesmen is the mechanism for the transference of the philosopher’s theories of virtue and good into the practical form of the city via the statesman’s weaving together of the web of politics. The Stranger states that, “in order to separate out the extreme elements of the city and determine the natures of the remaining inhabitants, the educators “will assay them first by child’s play, and after the assay it will hand them over to those who are capable of educating them and serving this purpose” (308d). These men acquire access to their students as children, and they educate them before turning them over to the statesman. When analyzing the process of weaving, Lane states, “the defining feature of this [the garment’s] unity...is that it rests entirely on the success of the preparatory stages which create a single unified ball of yarn ” (1998 170-71). Though she is commenting on the art of weaving as seen in the *Lysistrata* and not specifically *The Statesman*, her emphasis on the role of the preparatory functions, prior to the physical

¹⁹ That is not to say that all spinners are philosophers. As we saw previously in Socrates’ pairing of young men with rhetoricians, there are many other types of teachers that also ‘spin’ their young men into future threads of the city. However, the young men that the philosophers turn out are the individuals who insure the integration and preservation of virtue within the web of politics for the rest of the population, both free and slave (311c), to reap civic and philosophic benefits.

weaving together, are more than applicable to the hypothesis at hand. The significance is the same and in our argument it makes the philosopher crucial to the statesman as well as to the city, if any hope of unity is to be achieved. A final piece of evidence in favor of the philosopher-statesman distinction comes from the end of the weaving digression in *The Statesman*. The Stranger asks Young Socrates whether or not the digression was in vain, and if it would not have been just as effective to state that the weaver simply plait together woof and warp (283b). Young Socrates replies that nothing was said in vain, but leaves the reader of the dialogue unsure of his reasoning for such an agreement with the Stranger. However, once we see the necessity of two distinct arts for the creation of one unified whole, we can see that the weaving digression is integral for understanding the relationship between the philosopher, the statesman and the preservation of the city.

The statesman serves as a conduit between formal politics and the political philosophy of the philosopher. This partnership also illustrates how the philosopher himself can be barren of knowledge but still train those of a particular nature to do good and act with virtue within the world. Taking Socrates, and Plato more generally, at his word, we accept that there are different types of men and natures present in the world. A young man with a predisposition to public life and political affairs need not therefore be a philosopher but can nonetheless benefit and become a far greater statesman by being midwifed by one. Likewise, the philosopher need not have expertise in statesmanship in order to affect it in a positive way; he can bring virtue and temperate judgment to bear on it via the trained statesman. So when Lane asserts that, “it would seem that Socrates, in virtue of his negative and goading civic role, is not the person who could envisage or describe a full and positive true statecraft,” she is exactly right (2005 21). Socrates does not have to know or determine the specific actions, decisions and craft of those he trains in

order to help insure that their future decisions are good for the city. By default, those young men who have been midwifed will be “gentler and less tiresome... modest and not think [they] know what [they] don’t know” (210c). This type of character and admission of ignorance causes the statesman to make better decisions for the community at large, and not be irrationally swayed by either of the competing virtues present within the city. Miller demonstrates this point, insofar as “the excess of one ‘virtue’ makes it [the end of the city] ‘untimely’...[and] the statesman, choosing between the policy courses represented by the orator and the general, must recognize when each is ‘timely and untimely’” (Miller 110). This transference of philosophic concern over virtue into the decision-making mechanism of the polis results in a web of politics that continually grows more just and tempered by virtues over time. “The weaver-paradigm is in its essence Socratic, as it assigns to the weaver *direct* concern with the just, beautiful, and holy – though the weaver is concerned with these as they pertain not only to the individual souls but to the polis as a whole” (Weiss 222, emphasis author’s). Additionally, because the philosopher maintains such a central role in preparing the leaders of the city and by doing so insures the ongoing existence of philosophy within that web, the philosopher also secures his own position in the political world. By making the philosopher such an indispensable character in the mechanism of the city and its politics, and by structuring a partnership with the statesmen that weaves virtue into its people and its laws, the philosopher has also constructed a relationship that insulates him from the type of harm that brought about Socrates’ death.

What is uncertain about this regime of the partnership between the philosopher and the statesman is how it comes into being. One could posit that it is as utopian and foundational as the regime of the philosopher-king of *The Republic*. But it seems that our partnership would be less problematic to integrate into a political system than the rule of the philosopher-king.

Because the philosopher-statesman regime rests upon the education and tutelage of young men, and presumably at least some of those already under the care of Socrates, a gradual transition to the type of partnership discussed here seems plausible. Over time, the relationship between the web of politics and the training of the statesmen by philosophers becomes cyclical. With every successive generation, a new midwifing process begins. Thus, the role of the philosopher is both external to, yet intrinsically concerned with, politics and the art of rule. The philosopher's position within the polis is secured because the statesmen ruling the city accept protection of the philosophers' interest in bringing virtue to light as their own pragmatic duty within politics. In this way the philosopher is required for the existence and development of the city's way of life. By interpreting the relationship of the philosopher and the statesman as a partnership, many of the details regarding their respective capacities and duties to the city are also cleared up. For example, Lane somewhat cryptically asserts that, "the statesman is a philosopher in the sense of having philosophical knowledge, but he is not a philosopher if the question is how he is best defined. For he is best defined, precisely, as a statesman. *We might say that the statesman both is and is not a philosopher*" (Lane 2005 17, emphasis mine). This conclusion is confusing for two reasons. First, we do not know what 'philosophic knowledge' is because Socrates, the archetypal philosopher, always presents himself as barren of any knowledge. Second, if we are uncertain of the very definition, we cannot make the judgment as to whether the statesman (even if we grant that he may have more than one type of expertise) is best defined as either figure in the city. Yet, with our interpretation from above, we are able to claim with relative certainty that the statesman is not a philosopher. He may be trained by one, and carry into politics those concerns imbued in him by his midwife the philosopher, but the functions of the characters need not be folded in on one another.

Conclusion

Hopefully, this essay has shown that the philosopher and the statesman presented in the *Theaetetus* and *The Statesman* are not the same figure, but embody a partnership that brings virtue to the city and secures the place of the philosopher within it. By illustrating that the midwife and the philosopher are the same figure, with Socrates as the prototypical embodiment of both, while the statesman is the weaver, this essay has attempted to clarify how both types of men are necessary for the survival of a good city. Their differing functions are at its foundation the source of its preservation. The philosopher pairs men with trainers who help shape their natures to the fullest capacity, and the statesman takes the resultant men and pairs them with one another, as well as with women, in order to strike a balance between the competing natures of moderation and courageousness within the city.

What is novel about this interpretation of the dialogues, and of Platonic political philosophy more generally, is that this system does not require a dramatic and far-reaching blueprint to take effect. Unlike kallipolis from *The Republic*, there is no drastic restructuring of the city, or purging of the population required for the statesman and the philosopher to develop a partnership for the good of the city. The relationship between the philosopher and the statesman can be set up at any moment and requires only the good faith of its participants to succeed. Gradually, their relationship becomes entrenched, and takes on a more concrete and institutionalized character within the city, insofar as generation after generation is midwived for a public role. Depending on the natures of the young men, some take on the roles of the philosopher-midwife, some become statesmen. Through each of these cycles, virtue and prudence are compounded and permeate both private and public affairs. The web of politics becomes stronger, and the foundation between the philosopher and statesmen becomes more and

more resilient to external shocks. In this sense, it is precisely because of the non-utopian character of the web of politics and the role of the philosopher in helping to sustain it that his position within politics and the city at large is made more secure.

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